The Prince

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Title: The Prince

Author: Niccolò Machiavelli

Translator: W. K. Marriott

Release date: February 11, 2006 [eBook #1232]
Most recently updated: October 29, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1232

Credits: John Bickers, David Widger and Others

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE ***

The Prince

by Nicolo Machiavelli

Translated by W. K. Marriott

Contents

INTRODUCTION
YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94
OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512
LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27
THE MAN AND HIS WORKS
DEDICATION

THE PRINCE
CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE
CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS
CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY
CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED
CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES
CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN
CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR
CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS
CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED
CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH
CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?
CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER
CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA

_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to
1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic
missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512;
later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd
June 1527._

INTRODUCTION

Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the
second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,
and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were
members of the old Florentine nobility.

His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly
enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of
Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an
Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico.
The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year
Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career
Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted
until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his
office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they
were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s
literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few
weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his
fifty-eighth year, without having regained office.

YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94

Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the
Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of
this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been
described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by
the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving
Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have
been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the
fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a
gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed
prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean
rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli
strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to
Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_.

Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the
young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer
than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other
kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming,
and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with
wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly
was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli
shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and
leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:
“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure,
especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than
which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to
me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your
share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn
out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then,
you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters
and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I
have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success
and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help
you if you help yourself.”

OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512

The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the
free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the
expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After
serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed
Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and
Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of
Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the
affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and
dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere
recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and
soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and
supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters
which illustrate _The Prince_.

His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli”
of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it
is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on
fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is
urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.

In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for
continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct
of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft
summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also,
it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support
to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge
that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the
faith of princes.

Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out
of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the
Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The
Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke
for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have
seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the
pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed
by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the
duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the
fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that
might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save
him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens;
and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims
that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen
fatality.

On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to
watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia
cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano
delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most
reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election,
says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to
forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had
ruined Cesare.

It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that
pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought
to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing
chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius
that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and
women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man
that will win and hold them both.

It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian
states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany,
with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those
events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they
impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with
Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has
already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as
the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but
who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,
had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have
been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men
of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but
Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the
secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man,
without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to
carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of
his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with
events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the
three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the
object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in
the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won
in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during
these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out
between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had
dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II
finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance
of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy
of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the
Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st
September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal
for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end
to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining
office.

LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27

On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had
vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence,
was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he
was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,
imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope,
Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at
San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In
a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a
very interesting description of his life at this period, which
elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After
describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he
writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at
the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt,
and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass
into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly
received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I
do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their
actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I
feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay,
death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men.
And because Dante says:

Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
Unfruitful else,

I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have
composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as
fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a
principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how
they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever
pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince,
especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it
to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will
be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had
with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.”

The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form
in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work
during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some
unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although
Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or
presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo
ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any
employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime,
_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still
disputable.

Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this
little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that
during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have
neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by
one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my
loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not
now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as
I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my
honesty.”

Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his
“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read
concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied
him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look
after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the
Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her
citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new
constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on
one pretext or another it was not promulgated.

In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to
settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly
remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he
was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.”
It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance
of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which
occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have
determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer
observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will
endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play
with.”

When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to
Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in
the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is
somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The
Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained
power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence”
to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year
the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left
Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This
was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular
party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more
banished.

Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his
return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of
Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached
Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.

THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence
has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her
most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have
found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the
germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle
to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name,
it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which
this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that
the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more
reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy
necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.

Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and
industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and
with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced
retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he
depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the
successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only
moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political
employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII,
overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren
of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery
that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct
of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear
by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of
compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to
suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when
he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him
in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and
there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.

Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The
Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they
are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as
they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet
they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of
Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical
incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which
Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and
conduct.

Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish
some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The
Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men
are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the
days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices
which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.
Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them
to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;
prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to
a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an
empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the
arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to
fight.

It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government
should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the
people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of
society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little.
Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments
otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and
insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The
Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the
incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which
still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other
and their neighbours.

In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an
exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent
paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.
Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he
wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his
substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit
unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_
In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not
only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an
Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was
in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius
of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to
the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example:
the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy
adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would
by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every
contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that
“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting
their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and
ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome
maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four
words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity
of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to
the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that
the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may
overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.

The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:

Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di
trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto
dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da
Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;
Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’
Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di
Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,
1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,
1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in
verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,
1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in
terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il
riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di
Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie
fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.

Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti
carnascialeschi.

Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence,
6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,
1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.

Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E.
Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.
Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri
intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D.
Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.

DEDICATION

To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed
to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in
which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses,
arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented
to princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some
testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my
possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,
the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience
in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which,
having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now
send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,
nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable,
seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to
offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all
that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and
dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent
words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic
allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed
to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour
should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the
weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low
and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of
princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves
below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of
lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves
upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it
needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be
of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I
send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you
will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness
which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your
Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your
eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a
great and continued malignity of fortune.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I.
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED

All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II.
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,
and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than
new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,
for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless
he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if
he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to
the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius
in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the
hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices
cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects
will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and
duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are
lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.

CHAPTER III.
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and
this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein
they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the
gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in
the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time
it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the
borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to
bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be
defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
mentioned.

[1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who
married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and
died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and
what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself
more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold
them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;
and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of
the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in
other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will
live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,
and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has
only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of
their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws
nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will
become entirely one body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside
there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has
made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other
measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled
there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the
spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are
great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious
ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man
ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,
so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the
hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to
those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over
to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he
has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold
of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,
and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of
them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does
not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,
and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and
troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]
the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make
them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because
the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it
is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the
medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;
for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic
fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either
detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but
difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the
evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise
man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that
every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the
Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to
avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war
is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of
others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in
Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided
both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which
is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the
benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and
prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring
with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

[2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as
the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
a state composed of divers elements.

[3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,
died 1515.

[4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every
door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to
accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have
succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not
made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of
Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could
have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to
occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had
thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by
adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter
in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country
and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and
whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he
drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out
in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she
got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had
not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given
above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,
because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king
had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in
exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to
Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

[5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to
retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

[6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a
cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the
Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
who has been raised to power.

CHAPTER IV.
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons
have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and
hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a
prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king
take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both
of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state
of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The
causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that
the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can
he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the
lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his
ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with
great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when
they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,
for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his
own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has
been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot
replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this
prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the
others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not
rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,
for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the
victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves
the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either
to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings
the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would
have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults
raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed
there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other
than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V.
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the
next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live
under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an
oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a
government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand
without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support
him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will
hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other
way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they
lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities
in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them
otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city
accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do
or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and
his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to
obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in
making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern
themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a
prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But
in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire
for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of
their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them
or to reside there.

CHAPTER VI.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND
ABILITY

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely
to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A
wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to
imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not
equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the
clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far
distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow
attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of
so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a
new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of
these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,
and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy
to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have
acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their
particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be
found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.
And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed
anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material
to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that
opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and
without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of
bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of
the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.
Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,
and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity
whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on
their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily
believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they
are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties
in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the
ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are
overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,
they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards
powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like
kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private
station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him
for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one
who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.
This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old
alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on
such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had
endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.

[1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

CHAPTER VII.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF
OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as
happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might
hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens
came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the
fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable
things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not
reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having
always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it
because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,
and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became
princes, they must lay _afterwards_.

[1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and
correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of
“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be
Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called
by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy
of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he
had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise
and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and
fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

[2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria
Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,
on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli
was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia
(1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations
of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to
his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years
before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his
“Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare
Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the
present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be
laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see
his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the
Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini
were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he
saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been
assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,
namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved
him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,
so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was
easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other
reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not
only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving
the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy
with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He
was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the
attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the
king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the
Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was
hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that
the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,
that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might
themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the
same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and
attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And
as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the
Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from
that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the
arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that
in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned
entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the
Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came
to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length
that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,
called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the
rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless
dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the
French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse
to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with
all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the
Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his
power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned
their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good
foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of
Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he
gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,
and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

[3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if
any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in
the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took
Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the
piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The
barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied
and dismayed.

[4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if
he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,
for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would
not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and
to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards
the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.
It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would
have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church
might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which
Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as
to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope
with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the
college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before
the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first
shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had
accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords
as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the
Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And
as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,
for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French
were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and
in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down
upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines
would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was
prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much
power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer
have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his
own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and
he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the
foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not
had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he
would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his
foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a
month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst
the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they
could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope
him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not
have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of
Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day
that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought
of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had
provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,
when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

[5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

[6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad
Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to
offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of
others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and
only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness
frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to
secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome
either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate
those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of
things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to
destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship
with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal
and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the
actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope
to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected
Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any
cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they
became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom
he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear
him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the
kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above
everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad
Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages
to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his
choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

[7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII.
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be
more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other
modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these
two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a
private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established
in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself
prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that
which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding
for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,
was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the
senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating
to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the
senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held
the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he
was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not
only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for
its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time
raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme
necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,
leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.

[1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any
one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were
gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly
held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,
without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not
glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his
greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be
seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.
Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by
his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his
discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a
paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some
citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than
its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So
he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many
years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look
upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire
anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he
had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would
be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and
he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably
by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also
to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and
others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to
be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a
chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after
him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places
and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to
obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the
prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and
strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a
way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only
was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all
his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as
that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by
Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,
as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this
parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made
his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his
country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by
means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold
the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this
follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be
called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are
applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are
not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding
they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God
or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is
impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

[2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than
the more obvious “cruelties.”

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for
him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to
repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does
otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to
keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so
that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given
little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall
make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled
times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help
you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be
under any obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX.
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil
principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain
to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the
favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties
are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in
cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or
anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles
maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the
aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around
him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,
because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will
rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and
astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain
favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is
compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well
without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and
to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape
their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought
to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only
ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their
favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,
so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was
only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this
would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not
let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who
builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a
private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that
the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the
magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as
happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who
does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and
energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find
himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his
foundations well.

[1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus
in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

[2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s
“Florentine History,” Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not
the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the
citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,
are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will
always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For
such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when
citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with
him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to
die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this
experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore
a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will
always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state
and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.

CHAPTER X.
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO
BE MEASURED

It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in
case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack
them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot
show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.
And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often
repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are
always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it
will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town
well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,
because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they
have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they
always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking,
and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss
to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the
community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,
and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold
military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to
uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a
whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever
should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it
burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and
self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that
a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by
giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for
long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving
himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot
and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the
prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer
any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is
well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
fail to support and defend them.

CHAPTER XI.
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they
are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held
without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of
religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the
principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.
These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have
subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are
not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,
and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate
themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being
upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak
no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would
be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have
been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France
trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;
the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those
about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.
To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as
it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made
use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini
and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with
arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate
weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a
courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could
rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a
cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a
pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to
speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would
arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet
would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the
temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.

[1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have
ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all
his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the
way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only
followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin
the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:
the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and
the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused
the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their
cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster
the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to
support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders
and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope
Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,
if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more
venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

[2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.

CHAPTER XII.
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good
laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are
well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the
discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,
valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war
by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in
hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
have also suffered the penalty.

[1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_
of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized
Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his
quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the
country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King
Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a
kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy
without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont
to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,
to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,
you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted
to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it
ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so
that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes
and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and
mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to
bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its
citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and
Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely
armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]
allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His
father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left
her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms
of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the
Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these
arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have
defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been
favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have
stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and
others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer
was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot
be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the
Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the
Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco
turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while
ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most
prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest
renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have
been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became
the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if
they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their
achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and
gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed
gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned
to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they
forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the
beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to
fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under
Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him
a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),
and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they
feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they
were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to
lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order
to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their
captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of
Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not
gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost
that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much
trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed
and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

[2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

[3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

[4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by
Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into
Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many
wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible
Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of
Bernabo Visconti.

[5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.

[6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,
in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;
Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.

[7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain
authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became
princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both
commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8]
the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After
these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms
of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been
overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted
by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to
lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own.
They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,
they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not
give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a
moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs
were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand
soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They
had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to
themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking
prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at
night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night;
they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did
they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their
military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both
fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and
contempt.

[8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in
Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,”
composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.

CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by
Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise
against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to
auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his
assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in
themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.

[1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),
surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the
Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not
become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
the infidels.

[2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them
the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to
others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and
better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one
community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you
have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough
authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most
dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has
always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing
rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming
that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke
entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference
between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one
considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when
he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he
relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and
found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when
every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by
the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted
like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him
that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to
pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with
aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed
him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them
on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to
meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of
others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind
you fast.

Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]
having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,
recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
established in his kingdom